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Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees
Haris Aziz · Je´roˆme Lang · Je´roˆme Monnot
Abstract Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an im-
portant problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put
forth for desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and important
requirement. As asking agents to specify their preferences over exponentially many
subsets of alternatives is practically infeasible, we assume that each agent specifies
a weak order on single alternatives, from which a preference relation over subsets is
derived using some preference extension. We consider five prominent extensions (re-
sponsive, downward lexicographic, upward lexicographic, best, and worst). For each
of them, we consider the corresponding Pareto optimality notion, and we study the
complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. We also consider
strategic issues: for four of the set extensions, we present a linear-time, Pareto optimal
and strategyproof algorithm that even works for weak preferences.
Keywords committee selection ·multiwinner voting · Pareto optimality · algorithms
and complexity · set extensions.
JEL Classification: C70 · D61 · D71
1 Introduction
Pareto optimality is a central concept in economics and has been termed the “single
most important tool of normative economic analysis” (Moulin, 2003). An outcome
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is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another outcome that all agents like at least
as much and at least one agent strictly prefers. Although Pareto optimality has been
considered extensively in single-winner voting and other social choice settings such
as fair division or hedonic games, it has received only little attention in multiwinner
voting, in which the outcomes are sets of alternatives. Multiwinner voting applies
to selecting a set of plans or a committee, hiring team members, movie recommen-
dations, and more. For convenience, we use the terminology “committee” even if
our results have an impact far beyond committee elections (Faliszewski et al., 2017;
Aziz et al., 2017).
In single-winner voting setting, agents express preferences over alternatives and
a single alternative is selected. Pareto optimality in this context is straightforward to
define, achieve, and verify. In multiwinner voting, a well-known difficulty is that it
is unrealistic to assume that agents will report preferences over all possible commit-
tees, since there is an exponential number of them. For this reason, most approaches
assume that they only report a small part of their preferences, and that some exten-
sion principle is used to induce a preference over all possible subsets from this ‘small
input’ over single alternatives (Barbera` et al., 2004). Such preference extensions are
also widely used in other social choice settings such as fair division or matching. The
most two widely used choices of ‘small inputs’ in multiwinner voting are rankings
(linear orders) over alternatives and sets of approved alternatives. In this paper we
make a choice that generalizes both of them: agents report weak orders over single
alternatives. Then we consider five prominent preference extension principles: the
responsive extension, where a set of alternatives S is at least as preferred as a set of
alternatives T if S is obtained from T by repeated replacements of an alternative by
another alternative which is at least as preferred; the optimistic, or ‘best’ (respectively
pessimistic, or ‘worst’) extension, which orders subsets of alternatives according to
their most (respectively, least) preferred element; the downward lexicographic exten-
sion, a lexicographic refinement of the optimistic extension, and the upward lexico-
graphic extension, a lexicographic refinement of the pessimistic (worst) extension.
The responsive extension (Barbera` et al., 2004; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) can
be seen as the ordinal counterpart of additivity. The downward lexicographic ex-
tension has been considered in various papers (Bossert, 1995; Lang et al., 2012;
Klamler et al., 2012). The ‘best’ set extension has been considered in a number of
approaches such as full proportional representation (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983;
Monroe, 1995) and other committee voting settings Elkind et al. (2015). The ‘worst’
set extension, also used by Klamler et al. (2012) and Skowron et al. (2015b), captures
settings where the impact of a bad alternative in the selection overwhelms the ben-
efits of good alternatives: for instance, when the decision about a crucial issue will
be made by one of the members of the committee but the agent ignores which one
and is risk-averse; or the case of a parent’s preferences over a set of movies to be
watched by a child. The ‘best’ and ‘worst’ set extensions have been used in coalition
formation (Aziz and Savani, 2016; Cechla´rova´, 2008).
Although set extensions have been implicitly or explicitly considered in multi-
winner voting, most of the computational work has dealt with specific voting rules
(see the related work section). Instead, we concentrate on Pareto optimality, consider
the computation and verification of Pareto optimal committees, as well as the exis-
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Computation Verification
Set Extension
Responsive (RS) in PIC (Th. 5)
coNP-C (Th. 2), W[2]-hard
in P—dich. prefs and tw ≤ 2 (Th. 4)
Downward Lexicographic (DL) in PIC (Th. 8) coNP-C (Th. 1), W[2]-hard
Upward Lexicographic (UL) in PIC (Th. 11) coNP-C (Th. 2), W[2]-hard
Best (B)
NP-hard (Th. 7)
coNP-C, W[2]-hard (Th. 6)
in P for strict prefs
Worst (W) in PIC (Th. 10) in P (Th. 9)
Table 1 Complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal committees. PIC (coined by Christos Pa-
padimitriou in a seminar at Simons Institute in 2015) indicates a class of problems in which agents provide
the input and the problems admit a strategyproof and polynomial-time algorithm.
tence of a polynomial-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns Pareto optimal
outcomes.
Contributions We consider Pareto optimality with respect to the five aforementioned
preference set extensions. We present various connections between the Pareto opti-
mality notions. For each of the notions, we undertake a detailed study of complexity
of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the com-
plexity results.
An important take-homemessage of the results is that testing Pareto optimality or
obtaining Pareto improvements over status-quo committees is computationally hard
even though computing some Pareto optimal committee is easy. For responsive and
downward lexicographic extensions we give a complete characterization of the com-
plexity of testing Pareto optimality when preferences are dichotomous and the size of
top equivalence class is two: unless P =NP, Pareto optimality can be tested in polyno-
mial time if and only if the size of the first equivalence classes is at most two. For the
‘best’ extension, we show that even computing a Pareto optimal outcome is NP-hard.
Another interesting contrast with the responsive set extension is that even when pref-
erences are dichotomous and the size of top equivalence class is two, testing Pareto
optimality is coNP-complete. In contrast to the other extensions, for the ‘worst’ ex-
tension, both problems of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes admit
polynomial-time algorithms.
We also consider the requirement of strategyproofness on top of Pareto optimal-
ity. We show that there exist linear-time Pareto optimal and strategyproof algorithms
for committee voting even for weak preferences for four of the five set extensions.
The algorithms can be considered as careful adaptations of serial dictatorship for
committee voting.
2 Related Work
A first related stream of work involves studying specific committee elections rules
from a computational point of view (generally with little or no focus on Pareto opti-
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mality). Our focus on determining whether a committee is Pareto optimal or on find-
ing a Pareto optimal committee, is in some sense orthogonal to the study of committee
election rules. The simplest (and most widely used) rules for electing a committee,
called best-k rules, compute a score for each alternative based on the ranks, and the
alternatives with the best k scores are elected Elkind et al. (2014); Faliszewski et al.
(2016). Scoring-based extension principles have also been used by Darmann (2013).
Note that the output of a best-k rule is obviously Pareto-optimal for the preferences
induced by this scoring function, but not necessarily with respect to other set exten-
sions.
Klamler et al. Klamler et al. (2012) compute optimal committees under a weight
constraint for a single agent (therefore optimality is equivalent to Pareto optimality),
using several preference extensions including ‘worst’, ‘best’, and downward lexico-
graphic.
The ‘best’ (B) extension principle has been used in a number of pa-
pers on committee elections by full proportional representation, starting with
(Chamberlin and Courant, 1983) and studied from a computational point of view
in a long series of papers (e.g., (Procaccia et al., 2008; Lu and Boutilier, 2011;
Betzler et al., 2013; Skowron et al., 2015a; Elkind and Ismaili, 2015). These rules
obviously output Pareto optimal committees for B, but not necessarily for other ex-
tensions.
Some of the set extensions considered in this paper have corresponding analogues
when extending preferences over alternatives to preferences over ‘lotteries over alter-
natives.’ In particular, the RS set extension corresponds to SD (stochastic dominance)
lottery extension. Also the DL and UL set extensions considered in this paper cor-
respond to DL and UL lottery extensions considered in works in probabilistic social
choice (Brandl, 2013; Aziz et al., 2013b; Cho, 2016).
Some works are based on the Hamming extension. Each agent specifies his ideal
committee and he prefers committees with less Hamming distance from the ideal
committee. The Hamming distance notion can be used to define specific rules such as
minimax approval voting (Brams et al., 2007), which selects the committee minimiz-
ing the maximum Hamming distance for the agents. Although the output of minimax
approval voting is not always Pareto-optimal for the Hamming extension, there are
good Pareto-optimal approximations of it Caragiannis et al. (2010). Note that for di-
chotomous preferences, the Hamming extension coincides with the responsive and
the downward lexicographic extensions, therefore our computational results for re-
sponsive set extension for dichotomous preferences also hold for the Hamming and
downward lexicographic extensions.
A second line of work concerns understanding the classes of rules that result
in Pareto optimal outcomes. Most works along this line bear on a different type of
committee elections, called designated-seat voting, where candidates must declare
the seat they contest (Benoıˆt and Kornhauser, 2010).1 Results about the existence or
non-existence of Pareto optimal rules have been presented O¨zkal-Sanver and Sanver
(2006); Benoıˆt and Kornhauser (2010); Cuhadarogˇlu and Laine´ (2012).
1 If there are exactly two candidates per seat, then designated voting is equivalent to multiple referenda,
where a decision has to be taken on each of a series of yes-no issues.
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3 Setup
We consider a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and
a preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) such that each %i is a complete and transitive
relation over A. We write a %i b to denote that agent i values a at least as much as b
and use ≻i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a ≻i b iff a %i b but not b %i a. Finally, ∼i
denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a ∼i b iff both a %i b and b %i a.
The relation %i results in equivalence classes E
1
i
, E2
i
, . . . , E
ki
i
for some ki such that
a ≻i a
′ if a ∈ El
i
and a′ ∈ El
′
i
for some l < l′. We will use these equivalence classes
to represent the preference relation of an agent as a preference list i : E1
i
, E2
i
, . . . , E
ki
i
.
For example, we will denote the preferences a ∼i b ≻i c by the list i : {a, b}, {c}. An
agent i’s preferences are strict if the size of each equivalence class is 1. An agent i’s
preferences are dichotomous if he partitions the alternatives into just two equivalence
classes, i.e., ki = 2. Let Topwidth(%) be the maximum size of the most preferred
equivalence class, i.e., Topwidth(%) = maxi≤n |E
1
i
|. For any S ⊆ A, we will denote
by max%i(S ) and min%i(S ) the alternatives in S that are maximally and minimally
preferred by i respectively. Thus, if q and r are respectively the smallest and the
largest indices such that E
q
i
∩ S , ∅ and Er
i
∩ S , ∅, then max%i (S ) = E
q
i
∩ S and
min%i (S ) = E
r
i
∩ S . For k ≤ m, let S k(A) = {W ⊆ A : |W | = k}.
4 Set Extensions and Pareto Optimality
Set Extensions Set extensions are used for reasoning about the preferences of an
agent over sets of alternatives given their preferences over single alternatives. For
fixed-size committee voting, the responsive extension is very natural and has been ap-
plied in various matching settings as well (Barbera` et al., 2004; Roth and Sotomayor,
1990). For all V,W ∈ S k(A), we say thatW %
RS
i
V if and only if there is an injection f
from V toW such that for each a ∈ V , agent i weakly prefers f (a) to a, i.e. f (a) %i a.
We define the ‘best’ set extension and the ‘worst’ set extension which are denoted
B and W respectively. For all W,V ∈ S k(A), W %
B
i
V if and only if w %i v for
w ∈ max%i (W) and v ∈ max%i (V). On the other side, W %
W
i
V if and only if w %i v
for w ∈ min%i(W) and v ∈ min%i (V).
In the downward lexicographic (DL) extension, an agent prefers a committee that
selects more alternatives from his most preferred equivalence class, in case of equal-
ity, the one with more alternatives for the second most preferred equivalence class,
and so on. Formally,W ≻DL
i
V iff for the smallest (if any) l with |W ∩ El
i
| , |V ∩ El
i
|
we have |W ∩ El
i
| > |V ∩ El
i
|.
In the upward lexicographic (UL) extension, an agent prefers a committee that
selects less alternatives from his least preferred equivalence class, in case of equality,
the one with less alternatives for the second least preferred equivalence class, and so
on. Formally,W ≻UL
i
V iff for the largest (if any) l with |W ∩ El
i
| , |V ∩ El
i
| we have
|W ∩ El
i
| < |V ∩ El
i
|.
Remark 1 Consider an agent i with preferences %i over A. Let S , T ⊂ W such that
|S | = |T | = k. Then,
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– S %RS
i
T =⇒ S %DL
i
T =⇒ S %B
i
T
– S %RS
i
T =⇒ S %UL
i
T =⇒ S %W
i
T
– S ≻RS
i
T =⇒ S ≻DL
i
T
– S ≻RS
i
T =⇒ S ≻UL
i
T
The relations follow from the definitions.
Efficiency based on Set Extensions With each set extension E, we can define Pareto
optimality with respect to E. A committeeW ∈ S k(A) is Pareto optimal with respect
to E, or simply E-efficient, if there exists no committeeW′ ∈ S k(A) such that W
′
%
E
i
W for all i ∈ N andW′ ≻E
i
W for some i ∈ N. Note that for each of our set extensions,
E-efficiency coincides with standard Pareto optimality when k = 1. An outcome is
a Pareto improvement over another if each agent weakly improves and at least one
agent strictly improves.
Example 1 Consider the preference profile:
1 : a, b, c, d
2 : d, c, b, a
Suppose k = 2. Then,
– The unique B-efficient committee is {a, d}
– The uniqueW-efficient committee is {b, c}.
– The DL-efficient committees are {a, d}, {a, b}, and {d, c}.
– The UL-efficient committees are {b, c}, {a, b}, and {d, c}.
– The RS-efficient committees are {a, d}, {b, c}, {a, b}, and {d, c},
Remark 2 Consider a committee S .
– If S is DL-efficient, then S is RS -efficient
– If S is UL-efficient, then S is RS -efficient
The argument is as follows. Suppose S is not RS -efficient, then there exists some
other outcome T such that T %RS
i
S for all i ∈ N and T ≻RS
i
S for some i ∈ N. In that
case T %DL
i
S for all i ∈ N and T ≻DL
i
S for some i ∈ N. Also T %UL
i
S for all i ∈ N
and T ≻UL
i
S for some i ∈ N. Hence S is neither DL-efficient not UL-efficient.
Remark 3 There always exists a B-efficient committee that is also DL-efficient: DL
Pareto improvements over a B-efficient does not harm any agent with respect to the
B relation.
Remark 4 There always exists a W-efficient committee that is also UL-efficient: UL
Pareto improvements over a W-efficient does not harm any agent with respect to the
W relation.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the relations between the different efficiency notions.
Later on in the paper we will present an algorithm that returns a committee that is
UL-efficient and DL-efficient, and hence RS -efficient.
We also make the following general observation.
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B-efficiency W-efficiency
RS -efficiency
DL-efficiency UL-efficiency
Fig. 1 Relations between the five notions of efficiency. An arrow from E1-efficiency to E2-efficiency means
that E1-efficiency implies E1-efficiency; a dashed line means there always exists a committee that is both
E1- and E2-efficient; absence of arrow or line means that the sets of E1- and E2-efficient committees can
be disjoint.
Lemma 1 If there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a Pareto improvement
over a committee, then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an E-
efficient committee under set extensions E ∈ {RS ,DL,UL,W,B}.
Proof. Here, we start from any committee and we recursively apply Pareto improve-
ment until we reach a Pareto optimal committee. For the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ exten-
sions, there can be at most mn Pareto improvements because for one agent there can
be at most m improvements. Since an RS -improvement implies an DL-improvement,
let us bound the number of Pareto-improvements with respect to DL. In each Pareto-
improvement, for the agent who strictly improves, the most preferred equivalence
class that has different number of alternative in the outcome increases by at least one.
Therefore the most preferred equivalence class can be the improving class in at most
m of the Pareto improvements. Similarly, the number of Pareto improvements in the
subsequent less preferred equivalence class improves in a Pareto improvement can
be at most m of the Pareto improvements. Therefore the total number of DL Pareto-
improvements is bounded by m2n. A similar argument holds for UL as well. ⊓⊔
We end this section by observing that, under any of the set extensionswe consider,
a set of Pareto optimal alternatives may be Pareto dominated. Consider the following
example.
Example 2
1 : a, c, b, d 2 : a, d, b, c
3 : b, c, a, d 4 : b, d, a, c
The set {c, d} consists of Pareto optimal alternatives but is Pareto dominated by {a, b}
under any of our set extensions.
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5 Responsive Set Extension
There is a trivial way to achieve Pareto optimality under the responsive set extension
by taking any decreasing scoring vector consistent with the ordinal preferences, find-
ing the total score of each alternative and returning the set of k alternatives with the
maximum scores. For instance, on Example 2, the outcome of the rule that outputs
the alternatives with the best k Borda scores is {a, b}.
Theorem 1 A Pareto optimal committee under the responsive set extension commit-
tee can be computed in linear time.
In many situations, one may already have a status-quo committee and one may
want to find a Pareto improvement over it. This problem of testing Pareto optimality
and finding a Pareto improvement under the responsive set extension turns out to be a
much harder task. Note that if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a
Pareto improvement, then it means that testing Pareto optimality is also polynomial-
time solvable.
Theorem 2 Checking whether a committee is Pareto optimal under the responsive
set extension is coNP-complete, even for dichotomous preferences and Topwidth(%
) ≥ 3, or for strict preferences.
Proof. We only present the case where Topwidth(%) = 3. The reduction is from the
NP-complete problem vertex coverGarey and Johnson (1979). Given a simple graph
G = (V, E), the minimum vertex cover problem consists in finding a subset C ⊆ V of
minimum size such that every edge e ∈ E is incident to some node of C. Its decision
version vertex cover takes as input a simple graph G = (V, E) and an integer k and
problem is deciding if there exists a vertex cover C ⊆ V of G with |C| ≤ k.
Let 〈(V, E), k〉 be an instance of vertex cover, with [x, y] being one arbitrary edge
in E. We build the following instance of Pareto optimality under RS :
• N = ∪e∈ENe ∪ {a}, where for each edge e ∈ E, Ne is a set of k agents, and a is a
special agent.
• A = V ∪ D, where D = {d1, . . . , dk}.
• For each e = [u, v] ∈ E, the preferences of agent ei, for i = 1, . . . , k, and of agent
a, are
ei : {u, v, di}, (D − di) ∪ (V \ {u, v})
a : {x, y},D ∪ (V \ {x, y})
The reduction is clearly done within polynomial time and preferences are dichoto-
mous. We can check easily that committee D (of size k) is not Pareto optimal under
RS if and only if there exists a vertex cover of G of size at most k.
For strict preferences, in the previous reduction we replace {u, v, di}, . . . by
{u}, {v}, {di}, . . . in the preferences of e
i. It is easy to see that the proof is similar. ⊓⊔
Using a similar reduction from the Hitting Set problem, we can also
prove Theorem 3 that concerns a parametrized complexity intractability re-
sult Downey and Fellows (2013). Hitting Set is defined as follows: given a ground
set X of elements, and a collection C = {C1, . . . ,Cℓ} of subsets of X, does there exist
a H ⊂ X such that |H| ≤ k and H ∩ C , ∅ for all C ∈ C?
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Theorem 3 Checking whether a committee is Pareto optimal under the responsive
set extension is W[2]-complete under parameter k, even for dichotomous preferences.
For dichotomous preferences we present a complete characterization of the com-
plexity according to the Topwidth(%) parameter. If Topwidth(%) = 1, then in any
Pareto improvement over committee D, any alternative in D that is most preferred
by some agent needs to be kept selected, and therefore the problem of checking RS -
efficiency is easy. If Topwidth(%) ≥ 3, fromTheorem 2, the problem is hard. Remains
the case Topwidth(%) = 2.
Theorem 4 For dichotomous preferences, a Pareto improvement over a committee
with respect to the responsive set extension can be computed in polynomial time when
Topwidth(%) ≤ 2.
Proof. Consider a preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) where each %i is dichotomous
and verifies Topwidth(%) = 2, and let D ∈ S k(A). For each i ∈ N, let (E
1
i
, E2
i
) be the
partition associated with %i.
First, if for all i ∈ N, E1
i
⊆ D, then D is obviously RS -efficient. Assume it is not
the case, that is, (1) for some i ∈ N, E1
i
\ D , ∅. Let
– N′ = {i ∈ N : E1
i
∩ D = E1
i
}, W′ = ∪i∈N′E
1
i
(by construction, W′ ⊆ D), and
k′ = |W′|.
– N′′ = {i ∈ N \ N′ : E1
i
∩ (D \W′) , ∅} and A′′ = ∪i∈N′′E
1
i
.
Now, we build a graph G = (V, E) with V = {v1, . . . , vr} isomorphic to A
′′, and
[vp, vq] ∈ E iff E
1
i
= {ap, aq} for some i ∈ N
′′: each edge of G corresponds to the top
two alternatives of some agent, provided one of them is in D \ W′. Let τ(G) be the
size of an optimal vertex cover of G.
We first claim that there is a Pareto improvement over D if and only if one of
follows two conditions is satisfied:
(i) τ(G) < k − k′, or
(ii) τ(G) = k − k′, and there is an optimal vertex cover of G containing either at least
an element of E1
i
for some i < N′ ∪ N′′, or two elements of E1
i
for some i ∈ N′′.
We first show that (i) and (ii) are sufficient. If (i) holds then take a committee
corresponding to a minimum vertex cover ofG, add to it the k′ alternatives ofW′, and
add (k−k′)−τ(G) alternatives, with at least one in ∪i(E
1
i
\D); this is possible because
of (1). If (ii) holds, then take a committee corresponding to a minimum vertex cover
of G, and add to it the k′ alternatives of W′. In both cases, the obtained committee
contains E1
i
for all i ∈ N′, contains at least one element of E1
i
for all i ∈ N′, and
contains either two elements of E1
i
for some i ∈ N′′, or an element of E1
i
for some
i < N ∪ N′′. Therefore it is a Pareto-improvement over D.
Now, we show that (i) and (ii) are necessary. Let W ∈ S k(A) be a Pareto im-
provement of D containing a maximum number of alternatives from D. We have the
following two properties:W′ ⊆ W andW \W′ is a vertex cover ofG.W′ ⊆ W holds,
since otherwise there would be an i ∈ N′ such that W′ %RS
i
W does not hold. For
similar reasons,C′ = (W \W′)∩A′′ is a vertex cover ofG. If |(W \W′)∩A′′| < τ(G),
then by adding to it any set of D \ C′ of size k − k′ − τ(G) we obtain a set of size k
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which constitutes a Pareto improvement of D because now, E1
i
⊆ W for some i ∈ N′′.
If |(W \ W′) ∩ A′′| = τ(G), then (W \ W′) ∩ A′′ = W \ W′ and necessarily either
E1
i
∩ C , ∅ for some i < (N′ ∪ N′′) or E1
i
⊆ C for some i ∈ N′′.
It remains to be shown that (i) and (ii) can be checked in polynomial time. (i)
can be done in polynomial-time because G is bipartite: indeed, by construction, G
is two-colorable with color sets A′′ ∩ D and A′′ \ D, and by Ko¨nig’s theorem, for
bipartite graphs, the problem of finding the minimum vertex cover is equivalent to
computing a maximum matching, hence solvable in polynomial time. As for (ii), if
τ(G) = k− k′, we have to check whether for some optimal vertex coverC ofG, either
(ii.1) E1
i
∩ C , ∅ holds for some i < (N′ ∪ N′′), or (ii.2) E1
i
⊆ C for some i ∈ N′′.
In order to check (ii.1), for each i < (N′ ∪ N′′) such that there exists x ∈ E1
i
∩ A′′,
we transform G into a new bipartite graph G{x} where we add a new vertex x
′ and an
edge [x, x′]. In order to check (ii.2), for each i < N′′, let E1
i
= {x, y}; we transform
G into a new bipartite graphG{x,y} where we add two new vertices x
′ and y′, and two
edges [x, x′] and [y, y′]. Finally, we test if τ(G) = τ(G{x}) or if τ(G) = τ(G{x,y}) for one
of these graphs, because all optimal vertex covers of G{x} (respectively G{x,y}) must
contain x (respectively {x, y}). ⊓⊔
Example 3 We illustrate the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 4. Let k = 2 and
consider the dichotomous profile, where we specify only the top equivalence class of
each agent:
1 : {a, c} 2 : {b, c} 3 : {b, d}
4 : {d, e} 5 : {e, f }
Let D = {a, b}. We have N′ = W′ = ∅, k′ = 0, D \ W′ = {a, b}, N′′ = {1, 2, 3},
and A′′ = {a, b, c, d}. We construct the graph G = (V, E): V = {va, vb, vc, vd} and
E = {{va, vc}, {vb, vc}, {vb, vd}}. We have τ(G) = 2 = k − k
′. Now we consider the four
graphsG{d}, resulting from the addition toG of a new vertex vd′ and edge [vd, vd′], and
G{a,c},G{b,c} andG{b,d}:G{a,c} results from the addition toG of two new vertices va′ , vc′
and edges [va, va′] and [vc, vc′], etc. Two of these graphs have an optimal cover of size
2: G{d}, with optimal cover {vc, vd}, and G{b,c}, with optimal cover {vb, vc}. Therefore,
{c, d} and {b, c} are RS -Pareto-improvements over {a, b}, and {a, b} is not RS -efficient.
va vb
vdvc
va vb
vd vd′vc vc′
va vb vb′
vdvc
G G{d} G{b,c}
Fig. 2 Graphs corresponding to Example 3
Note that finding an algorithm that computes a Pareto improvement over a com-
mittee can be used to decide whether a given a committee D of size k, is Pareto
optimal under the responsive set extension.
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Pareto optimality and Strategyproofness We now try to achieve both RS -efficiency
and strategyproofness simultaneously. A mechanism f is strategyproof if reporting
truthful preferences is a dominant strategy with respect to the responsive set exten-
sion: f (%) %RS
i
f (%′
i
,%−i) for all preference profiles% and (%
′
i
,%−i). Note that defining
strategyproofness in this way with respect to the RS extension is stronger than defin-
ing it for any of the other four extensions considered in this paper. Nonetheless, we
will present some positive results with respect to strategyproofness.
A naive way of achieving RS -efficiency and Pareto optimality is to enumerate
the list of possible winning sets and implement serial dictatorship over the possible
outcomes as is done in voting (Aziz et al., 2013b). However, the number of possible
outcomes is exponential and responsive preferences result in a partial order over the
possible winning sets and not a complete and transitive order. This problem is solved
by Algorithm 1 which can be viewed as a computationally efficient serial dictatorship.
Algorithm 1 Committee Voting Serial Dictatorship
Input: (N, A,%, k, permutation π of N)
Output: W ∈ S k(A).
1 L (last set to be refined) ←− A
2 r (number of alternatives yet to be fixed)←− k; W ←− ∅
3 i′ (index of the permutation π)←− 1
4 while r , 0 or i′ , n do
5 Agent i = π(i′) selects first t equivalence classes such that |
⋃t
j=1 E
j
i
∩L| ≥ r and |
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
i
∩L| < r.
6 W ←−W ∪ (
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
i
∩ L) (we say agent i fixes the alternatives in
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
i
);
7 r ←− |
⋃t
j=1 E
j
i
∩ L| − |
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
i
∩ L|
8 L←− Et
i
; ri′ ←− r
9 Increment i′ by one
10 end while
11 if r > 0 then
12 pick any r alternatives from L and add them to W
13 end if
14 return W
Theorem 5 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a
committee that is Pareto optimal under the responsive set extension.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. We show that at each stage i′, agent π(i′), implicitly
refines the set of feasible committees to the maximal set of most preferred outcomes
from the set by providing additional constraints. This is true for the base case i′ = 1.
Now assume it holds from 1 to i′. Note that L contains all those alternatives that are
strictly less preferred by agents in {π(1), . . . , π(i′)} than the ones they respectively
fixed. Moreover, each agent in {1, . . . , π(i′)} is indifferent between the alternatives in
L. As for π(i′ + 1), he fixes the best |
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
π(i′+1)
∩ L| alternatives in L where t is the
value such that |(
⋃t
j=1 E
j
π(i′+1)
) ∩ L| ≥ ri′ and |
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
π(i′+1)
∩ L| < ri′ . For E
t
π(i′+1)
, the
agent only requires that ri′+1 = |(
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
π(i′+1)
)∩L|−|(
⋃t−1
j=1 E
j
π(i′+1)
)∩L| alternatives are
selected from his equivalence class Et
π(i′+1)
which is ensured by the definition of the
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algorithm. It follows from the argument that the returned set is Pareto optimal under
the responsive set extension. For strategyproofness, when an agent π(i′) turn comes,
it only has a choice over fixing the alternatives in L and requiring ri′ alternatives from
his equivalence class Et
π(i′)
. In this case the algorithm already chooses one of the best
possible committees for the agent. ⊓⊔
Note that for k = 1, the algorithm is equivalent to serial dictatorship as formalized
by Aziz et al. (2013a). Note that a committee that is Pareto optimal under the respon-
sive set extension may not be a result of serial dictatorship. This holds even for k = 1
and the basic voting setting.
The problem with the serial dictatorship algorithm formalized is that it overly
favours the agent that is the first in the permutation. One way to limit his power
is to let him choose only ⌈k/n⌉ alternatives. We note that this attempt at having a
fairer extension of serial dictatorship comes at an expense because strategyproofness
is compromised. Consider the profile in which 1 has preferences a, b, c and 2 has
preferences a, c, b. For k = 2, and permutation 12, the outcome is {a, c}. But if agent
1 reports b, a, c, then the outcome is {a, b}.
6 ‘Best’ Set Extension
Next, we consider Pareto optimality with respect toB, which has been used for defin-
ing many rules (see Section 2).
Theorem 6 Unless P=NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm to compute a
Pareto improvement over a committee with respect to B, even for dichotomous pref-
erences and Topwidth(%) = 2.
Proof. We show that if it is not the case, then we can solve polynomially the ver-
tex cover decision problem. Consider an instance of vertex cover given by a simple
graphG = (V, E) with V = {v1, . . . , vq} and E = {e1, . . . , er}, and an integer k. Assume
the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm Algo that computes a Pareto improve-
ment over a committee with respect to B when Topwidth(%) ≤ 2: given a profile %
and a set of k alternativesW, Algo(%,W) returns, in time polynomial in | % |, Yes if
W is Pareto optimal with respect to B, and otherwise returns a k-set U of alternatives
which Pareto dominates W. We will now prove by applying at most n times Algo
with different inputs that we can decide in polynomial if G has a vertex cover C ⊆ V
of G with |C| ≤ k. We construct the following profile P:
• The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , q + r − k}, where agent i ≤ r corresponds to edge
ei ∈ E.
• The set of 2q − k alternatives is A = V ∪ D where D = {d1, . . . , dq−k}.
• Let ei = [u, v] ∈ E be an edge of G; the preferences of agent i for i = 1, . . . , r are:
i : {u, v},D ∪ (V \ {u, v}).
The preferences of the last set of q − k agents {r + 1, . . . , q + r − k} are given by:
for i = 1, . . . , q − k,
r + i : di,V ∪ (D \ {di}).
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The reduction is clearly done within polynomial time and the set of preferences
given by % are dichotomous.
Consider the following inductive procedure: W0 = V and for i ≥ 1, Wi = Algo
(%,Wi−1) if Wi−1 is not Pareto optimal with respect to B, otherwise we return Wi−1.
Let W = Wq−k be the solution output after q − k calls. Because Algo is polynomial,
the whole procedure is polynomial.
We claim that G has a vertex cover of size k iff D ⊆ W. We will first prove by
induction that at each step i, Wi \ D is a vertex cover of G. For the initial step, it
is valid because V is a vertex cover of G. Assume that it is true for i < q − k and
let us prove that Wi+1 \ D is a vertex cover of G. If it is not the case, some edge
e j = [u, v] ∈ E is not covered. By assumption, e j is covered by Wi \ D. This implies
Wi ≻
B
j
Wi+1, which is a contradiction. Hence,Wi+1 %
B
j
Wi. From this hypothesis, we
deduce D \ Wi+1 %
B
j
D \ Wi for j = n + 1, . . . , 2n − k with a strict preference for
some agent. Equivalently,D\Wi ⊂ D\Wi+1. In conclusion, after q−k recursive calls,
|W \ D| ≤ k if and only if D ⊆ W. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7 Computing a B-efficient committee is NP-hard, even for dichotomous
preferences.
Proof. We give a reduction from Hitting Set. Let N = {1, . . . , ℓ}, A = X and for each
i ∈ N, i’s dichotomous preferences are i : Ci, (X \ Ci). If there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute a B-efficient committee, it will return a committee in
which each agent gets a most preferred alternative if such a committee exists. But
such a committee corresponds to a hitting set of size k. ⊓⊔
7 Downward Lexicographic Set Extension
We point out that for dichotomous preferences, the responsive set extension coin-
cides with the downward lexicographic set extension. Hence we get a corollary of
our results for responsive preferences:
Corollary 1 Checking whether a committee is DL-efficient is coNP-complete, even
for dichotomous preferences and Topwidth(%) ≥ 3.
Note that Algorithm 1 returns a DL-efficient committee. The reason is that each
agent in her turn refines the set of possible outcomes to her most preferred subset of
outcomes. Each committee is the refined set is at least as preferred with respect to RS
(and hence with respect to DL) to all committees in the set of possible outcomes.
Theorem 8 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a DL-
efficient committee.
8 ‘Worst’ Set Extension
In contrast to all the other set extensions considered in the paper, Pareto optimality
with respect to the ‘worst’ set extension can be checked in polynomial time.
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Theorem 9 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that checks whether a commit-
tee is W-efficient and computes a Pareto improvement over it if possible.
Proof. LetW ∈ S k(A). For each i ∈ N, let E
ti
i
be the least preferred equivalence class
such that E
ti
i
∩ W , ∅. We want to check whether there is a k-set D of alternatives
in which at least some agent i ∈ N gets a strictly better outcome and all the other
agents get at least as preferred an outcome. We check this as follows. For i ∈ N,
let Bi = A \ ((
⋃ki
ℓ=ti
Eℓ
i
) ∪
⋃
j∈N\{i}
⋃k j
ℓ=t j+1
Eℓ
j
)). We check whether |Bi| ≥ k or not.
If |Bi| ≥ k, we know that there exists a subset of Bi, that is strictly more preferred
by i ∈ N and at least as preferred by each agent. The reason is that Bi contains a
more preferred worst alternative for agent i than D and contains at least as preferred
worst alternative for other agents j than D. If |Bi| < k, then this means that a Pareto
improvement with i strictly improving is only possible if the size of the winning set
is less than k which is not feasible. ⊓⊔
We now consider strategyproofness together withW-efficiency.We first note that
Algorithm 1 may not return a W-efficient outcome. However, we construct a suit-
able strategyproof and W-efficient by formalising an appropriate serial dictatorship
algorithm for the worst set extension.
Theorem 10 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a
W-efficient committee.
Proof. Consider the agents in a permutation π. The set of alternatives A′ is initialized
to A. We reduce the set A′ while ensuring that it of size at least k. The next agent i
in the permutation comes and deletes the maximum number of least preferred equiv-
alence classes from his preferences and the corresponding alternatives in A′ while
ensuring that |A′| ≥ k. Each successive agent in the permutation gets a most preferred
outcome while ensuring that agents before him in the permutation get at least as pre-
ferred an outcome as before. Thus the algorithm is strategyproof and Pareto optimal
with respect to the ‘worst’ set extension. ⊓⊔
9 Upward Lexicographic Set Extension
We point out that for dichotomous preferences, the responsive set extension coincides
with the upward lexicographic set extension. Hence we get a corollary of our results
for responsive preferences:
Corollary 2 Checking whether a committee is UL-efficient is coNP-complete, even
for dichotomous preferences and Topwidth(%) ≥ 3.
Note that Algorithm 1 returns a UL-efficient committee. The reason is that each
agent in her turn refines the set of possible outcomes to her most preferred subset of
outcomes. Each committee is the refined set is at least as preferred with respect to RS
(and hence with respect to UL) to all committees in the set of possible outcomes.
Theorem 11 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a
UL-efficient committee.
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10 Conclusions
We considered Pareto optimality in multi-winner voting with respect to a number of
prominent set extensions. We presented results on the relations between the notions
as well as complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. Further
directions of future work include considering Pareto optimality with respect to other
set extensions (Brandt and Brill, 2011). Another direction is consider the compatibil-
ity of Pareto optimality concepts with other axioms. Finally, we remark that our serial
dictatorship algorithm can be used to define a multiwinner generalization of random
serial dictatorship, which is worth investigating and raises interesting computational
problems.
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